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Abstract
This article relies on data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics matched to U.S. 
census data to explain the factors contributing to homeownership transitions for a sample 
of renters who first left their parents’ homes during the years 1978 through 1987. The 
article employs continuous time duration models to explain first-time homeownership 
transitions as a function of various individual and household-level variables, along with 
measures of urban sprawl. The article finds that for the average renter in the sample, 
first-time homeownership occurs sooner in areas with lower urban densities, increased 
local government fragmentation, and the presence of a regional urban growth boundary 
(UGB). The effects of UGB presence and local government fragmentation are largest 
among suburban low-income households. 
A previous version of this article was presented at the DeVoe L. Moore Center Workshop on State 
and Local Regulation at Florida State University and the 2005 Association of Collegiate Schools of 
Planning Conference in Kansas City, Missouri. The construction of the database used in this analysis 
was funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The data used in this 
analysis are derived from the Sensitive Data Files of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), 
obtained under special contractual arrangements designed to protect the anonymity of respondents. 
These data are not available from the author. Persons interested in obtaining PSID Sensitive Data 
Files should contact the Institute for Social Research through the Internet at PSIDHelp@isr.umich.edu.84 Regulatory Innovation and Affordable Housing
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Introduction
In a recent issue of Housing Policy Debate, Matthew Kahn (2001) empirically documented a negative 
relationship between urban sprawl and the “black/white” homeownership gap (among other 
measures of housing consumption). His explanation for this finding is that urban sprawl is associated 
with increased housing affordability in both the central city and suburbs. According to Kahn 
(2001: 84), “One reason sprawl reduces the black/white gap in unit size and ownership rates is 
that increased fringe urbanization leads to a greater supply of land for development, which increases 
affordability. A second explanation is that, as jobs move to the fringe in older sprawling metropolitan 
areas such as Detroit and Philadelphia, the durable inner-city housing stock becomes even cheaper.” 
This article extends Kahn’s (2001) findings by investigating the effect of sprawl on the timing of 
first-time homeownership transitions. If sprawl influences regional housing affordability, then 
prospective first-time homebuyers may be able to move into homeownership sooner than they 
would otherwise in metropolitan areas exhibiting lower levels of urban sprawl. As with African-
American households, first-time homebuyers as a group tend to exhibit lower incomes and lower 
levels of accumulated wealth (Boehm, 1993; Haurin, Hendershott, and Wachter, 1997). Thus, one 
might expect that, just as homeownership becomes more likely among all African Americans living 
in more sprawled metropolitan areas, homeownership may also occur sooner for those purchasing 
their first home in more sprawled metropolitan areas, if income increases monotonically over the 
course of the household life cycle. 
This article also examines the homeownership effects of three alternative measures of sprawl not 
considered by Kahn (2001): (1) a measure of the density of the urban settlement pattern, (2) a 
measure of local government fragmentation, and (3) a measure of the presence or absence of re-
gional urban growth boundaries (UGBs). It also examines variability in the effects of each measure 
across central city and suburban locations. 
The investigation of this issue relied on data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) matched 
to U.S. census data to explain the factors contributing to homeownership transitions for a sample 
of renters who first left their parents’ homes during the years 1978 through 1987. Continuous time 
duration models are employed to explain first-time homeownership transitions as a function of 
various individual, household, and location-specific variables, including measures of urban sprawl. 
Findings show that for the average renter in the sample, first-time homeownership occurs sooner 
in areas with lower urban densities, increased local government fragmentation, and the presence 
of a regional UGB. The effects of UGB presence and local government fragmentation are largest 
among suburban low-income households. These results provide new insights into the dimensions 
of sprawl that are most important to first-time homebuyers. 
Urban Sprawl and the Timing of First-Time Home Purchase
Urban sprawl has been defined as any development pattern exhibiting an excessively large develop-
ment footprint for a given metropolitan resident population (Brueckner, 2000; Nechyba and 85 Cityscape
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Walsh, 2004). Urban economic theory points to three primary ways in which large development 
footprints may affect the timing of first-time homeownership transitions. First, as suggested by 
Kahn (2001), urban sprawl may affect the user cost of owner occupancy. In the traditional mono-
centric model of urban land use (Alonso, 1964; Mills, 1972; Muth, 1969), housing that is located 
farther from the region’s employment center commands a lower price, due to the capitalization 
of reduced accessibility into the price of housing. Thus, holding population constant, an increase 
in the outer extent of a given urban development pattern and a concomitant increase in the total 
development footprint would tend to drive housing prices downward throughout the metropolitan 
area as more households occupy housing located farther from the region’s employment center. Facing 
lower user costs of owner occupancy, renters residing in more sprawling cities should enter home-
ownership sooner than otherwise equivalent renters searching for housing in more compact cities.
Filtering models of housing supply suggest another explanation for the link between urban sprawl 
and housing affordability. As metropolitan areas expand and new housing is built at the fringe of the 
metropolitan area, existing housing located closer to the central business district ages and depreciates 
in value, thus opening up affordable housing opportunities near the central city (Sweeney, 1974). 
Again, facing lower user costs of owner occupancy near the central city, renters in metropolitan 
areas that have an increased supply of older central city housing may accelerate entry into home-
ownership, provided the cost of maintaining older central city housing is not prohibitively high.
A final hypothesized link between sprawl and first-time homeownership comes from Charles 
Tiebout (1956). Sprawled metropolitan areas tend to exhibit higher degrees of local government 
fragmentation. As the population decentralizes, new suburban communities are often created to 
satisfy the local public service demands of new residents. The proliferation of local governments 
within sprawled metropolitan areas increases the range of local public service options available to 
prospective homeowners. Facing increased “Tiebout choice,” (Hoxby, 2000) first-time homebuyers 
may move into homeownership sooner, because they may be more likely to find a housing service 
package that includes, as part of the bundle, their ideal quantity and mix of local public services. 
To date, no study has examined the effects of these three dimensions of urban sprawl on the 
dynamics of first-time homeownership transitions. First-time homebuyers are an interesting group 
to consider because, although affordability constraints are most likely to affect this group, they 
are among those most likely to value the accessibility provided by more compact cities. Consider 
exhibit 1, which describes the characteristics of first-time homebuyers compared to other recent 
homebuyers using the 2001 American Housing Survey (AHS) as summarized in the U.S. Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD’s) fourth quarter 2003 U.S. Housing Market 
Conditions report (HUD, 2004). 
Compared with other homebuyers who moved into their homes within the year preceding the 
2001 AHS, first-time homebuyers were more likely to be non-White and belong to single-parent 
family or nonfamily households with a combined household income of about $12,000 less than 
the income earned by other recent homebuyers. The average first-time homebuyer household head 
is also approximately 12 years younger than other recent homebuyers.86 Regulatory Innovation and Affordable Housing
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These characteristics imply that first-time homebuyers may exhibit unique housing preferences. 
Consider the tradeoff between housing costs and savings in leisure time predicted by the mono-
centric model. In this case, first-time homebuyers, who are more likely to be young, single, and 
childless, may exhibit stronger tastes for leisure time and interactions with other young adults 
relative to households with children. If this is the case, then these individuals may be willing to pay 
more for housing that is accessible to the region’s central business district. Because a greater supply 
of accessible housing exists within more compact metropolitan areas, first-time homebuyers may 
be more willing to move into these units sooner. Similarly, given that the existing housing stock 
in the central city likely filters down to lower quality submarkets more slowly in more compact 
metropolitan areas, first-time homebuyers may perceive central city housing to be of higher quality 
in more compact metropolitan areas relative to sprawled metropolitan areas. Finally, the increased 
number of suburban government choices available in more fragmented metropolitan areas may 
be less appealing to those who do not value suburban amenities such as the high quality of local 
public schools.
The differences in housing characteristics of first-time homebuyers and other recent homebuyers 
shown at the bottom of exhibit 1 provide some support for these arguments. Note that first-time 
homebuyers are more likely to reside in accessible central city locations. First-time homebuyers 
Exhibit 1
First-Time Homebuyers Other Recent Buyers
Number  Percent Number  Percent
Demographic and Housing Stock Characteristics of First-Time Homebuyers and 
Other Recent Buyers               
Demographic characteristics
Race and ethnicity
White, non-Hispanic 1,568,866 68 2,689,900 83
Black, non-Hispanic 258,036 11 176,148 5
Other, non-Hispanic 171,979 7 132,899 4
Hispanic 297,248 13 256,467 8
Family and household type
Husband-wife families 1,245,991 54 2,147,071 66
Other families 402,086 18 380,937 12
Nonfamily households 648,052 28 727,406 22
Median age of householder 31 43
Median household incomea  49,300 61,648
Housing stock characteristics
Location in central city 598,975 26 657,634 20
Single-family, detached 1,615,226 70 2,528,880 78
Condominium/cooperative ownership 251,716 26 244,188 15
Built in 1990 or later 710,405 31 1,436,076 44
Median number of rooms 6.2 6.8
Median value of homea 113,200 151,500
a In dollars.
Source: 2001 American Housing Survey, summarized in HUD (2003)87 Cityscape
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also are more likely to reside in housing types (older, non-single-family detached, condominium) 
that are more commonly found in areas within close proximity to central business districts.
To conclude, the theoretical link between urban sprawl and the timing of first-time homeowner-
ship transitions is ambiguous. Although first-time homebuyers typically earn lower incomes and 
consume less expensive housing than those purchasing their second or third home, first-time 
homebuyers may exhibit unique preferences for accessible housing found only in more compact 
urban areas. The following sections examine this issue empirically, using data from a national 
sample of renters.
Data and Empirical Strategy
The empirical analysis relies on data from the PSID from waves 1978 through 1997. The sample 
used to estimate the determinants of first-time homeownership includes all individuals who were 
children or grandchildren of PSID families in 1977 and who subsequently moved out of their 
parents’ home for the first time during the period 1978 through 1987. This sample follows these 
individuals from their initial “splitoff” (move out of the parents’ residence) until the year in which 
an individual purchased his or her first home. Individuals who did not reside in metropolitan areas 
during any portion of the study period were omitted from the analysis. Individuals who moved 
into homeownership within a metropolitan area that was different from their rental neighborhood 
were also omitted from the analysis, because, for those households, the metropolitan characteristics 
while renting would not accurately describe the metropolitan characteristics they faced at the time 
they made a tenure transition. 
For this sample, estimated regression models explain the duration of time from splitoff until 
transition to first-time homeownership. Several parametric duration models with time-varying 
covariates are examined. In previous investigations of first-time homeownership, Boehm (1993) 
has examined the exponential model extensively. This article examines this model and three other 
more flexible functional forms that allow for heterogeneous survival distributions across individu-
als’ (exponential with gamma heterogeneity) duration dependence (Weibull) and nonmonotonicity 
in the estimated duration dependence parameter (log-logistic). The log-likelihood functions for all 
estimated models are adjusted to account for right-censoring resulting from uncompleted rental 
tenure duration spells. See Dawkins (2005a) for a more detailed description of the empirical ap-
proach employed. 
To explain rental tenure durations, the article relies on traditional variables used in previous tenure 
choice studies. Descriptive statistics and variable definitions are shown in exhibit 2.
The estimated models include information on a variety of personal and household characteristics, 
including gender, age, marital status, and number of children in the individual’s household that 
have been shown to be correlated with housing demand. Of those characteristics, marital status 
and number of children vary with rental tenure duration, while gender and age are measured at 
the time of splitoff and do not vary with time. Two measures of education are included: (1) a time-
varying measure of the number of years of education attained by time t and (2) a dummy variable 88 Regulatory Innovation and Affordable Housing
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Exhibit 2
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev.
Descriptive Statisticsa (1 of 2)
Rental tenure duration Years from splitoff until first-time homeownership 
transition
8.662 5.362
Splitoff indicators
Splitoff in 1978 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual left 
their parents’ home in 1978, 0 otherwise
0.100 0.301
Splitoff in 1979 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual left 
their parents’ home in 1979, 0 otherwise
0.131 0.338
Splitoff in 1980 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual left 
their parents’ home in 1980, 0 otherwise
0.118 0.322
Splitoff in 1981 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual left 
their parents’ home in 1981, 0 otherwise
0.089 0.285
Splitoff in 1982 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual left 
their parents’ home in 1982, 0 otherwise
0.090 0.287
Splitoff in 1983 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual left 
their parents’ home in 1983, 0 otherwise
0.093 0.291
Splitoff in 1984 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual left 
their parents’ home in 1984, 0 otherwise
0.087 0.282
Splitoff in 1985 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual left 
their parents’ home in 1985, 0 otherwise
0.111 0.314
Splitoff in 1986 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual left 
their parents’ home in 1986, 0 otherwise
0.085 0.279
Splitoff in 1987 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual left 
their parents’ home in 1987, 0 otherwise
0.095 0.293
Personal and household characteristics
Black Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual is 
Black, 0 otherwise
0.548 0.498
Age at splitoff Age of individual at time of splitoff 22.337 3.328
Male Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual is male, 
0 otherwise
0.552 0.498
Student at splitoff Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual is a 
student at splitoff, 0 otherwise
0.051 0.220
Years of education  Individual’s years of education completed at time t 12.355 2.966
Marital status Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual is 
married at time t, 0 otherwise 
0.430 0.495
Number of children Number of children in household at time t 0.947 1.283
Parents’ ownership status Dummy variable equal to 1 if the parents of the 
individual are owner occupants at time of 
splitoff, 0 otherwise
0.610 0.488
Parents’ nonhousing  
wealthb 
Parents’ income from nonhousing wealth at time 
of splitoff
0.991 7.799
Permanent incomeb  Predicted value from an equation where current 
income is regressed on various human capital 
variables at time t
20.183 8.540
Transitory incomeb  Residual of current family income and expected 
income at time t
7.331 21.223
Nonhousing wealthb  Value of nonhousing assets at time t 2.226 44.791
Employment status Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual is 
employed at time t, 0 otherwise 
0.502 0.50089 Cityscape
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equal to 1 if the individual became a student at the time of splitoff. Finally, the models include a 
time-varying measure of employment status. 
The models also include several measures of income and wealth. Permanent income is estimated  
as the predicted value of family income in a regression of income on various human capital 
controls. Estimates from the auxiliary regression used to estimate permanent income are included 
in appendix A. Transitory income is the residual of current family income and expected family 
income at time t. Both of these measures vary with time. A time-varying measure of nonhousing 
wealth is calculated as the total value of nonhousing assets, including rent, interest, dividends, 
trust funds, and royalties. This measure, along with a dummy variable indicating the parents’ 
homeownership status, is also calculated for each individual’s parents by matching the individual 
to his or her original 1977 PSID family and extracting the value of the household head’s nonhousing 
wealth and homeownership status. All monetary values are adjusted to 1997 values using the 
Consumer Price Index deflator.
Exhibit 2
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev.
Descriptive Statisticsa (2 of 2)
Regional controls
Northeast Region Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual resides 
in the Northeast, 0 otherwise
0.130 0.336
Midwest Region  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual resides 
in the Midwest, 0 otherwise
0.261 0.439
South Region Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual resides 
in the South, 0 otherwise
0.434 0.496
West Region Dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual resides 
in the West, 0 otherwise
0.175 0.380
MSA controls
Central city Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household 
resides in the central city, 0 otherwise
0.418 0.493
Log MSA population Log of total MSA population, 1980 14.203 1.093
MSA population growth, 
1980–90
Log (1990 MSA population/1980 MSA population) 0.093 0.204
Percent MSA owner 
occupant
Percent of MSA occupied housing that is owned, 
1980
0.679 0.306
MSA average owner-
occupied housing valueb
Average value of MSA owner-occupied housing, 
1980
64.712 19.747
Urban density Total MSA population/total MSA urbanized land 
area
5.637 2.684
Local government 
fragmentation
MSA Herfindahl index (see text) 0.472 0.285
UGB Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household 
resides in an MSA surrounded by a regionwide 
UGB, 0 otherwise
0.074 0.261
N 1,494
MSA = metropolitan statistical area. UGB = urban growth boundary.
a All descriptive statistics are evaluated at time of homeownership transition.
b In thousands of dollars.90 Regulatory Innovation and Affordable Housing
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The models use three different measures of urban sprawl. The first is a measure of urban density, 
measured as the total 1980 metropolitan statistical area (MSA) population divided by the total 
1980 urbanized land area for the metropolitan area. This measure is discussed extensively in 
Fulton et al. (2001). The advantage of this measure, as opposed to most traditional measures of 
urban density, is that the denominator (urbanized land area) is based on the total area of urbanized 
land rather than the commonly used Census “urbanized area,” which does not consider actual land 
use. The data on urbanized land area were constructed from satellite imagery information available 
from the National Resources Inventory. Rolf Pendall from the Fulton et al. (2001) team kindly 
provided these measures for use in this analysis. 
The second measure of urban sprawl is an index of local government fragmentation based on the 
Herfindahl index. This index is calculated as 1-Σihi
2, where hi is the ith municipality’s share of total 
1980 MSA population. A value of 0 for this index implies that all of the MSA population resides in 
one municipality, while 1 implies that the population is evenly distributed across many equal-sized 
districts. This measure has been used extensively in other similar studies of local government 
fragmentation (Dawkins, 2005b; Hoxby, 2000). 
The final measure of urban sprawl is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household resides in a 
metropolitan area surrounded by a regional UGB and equal to 0 otherwise. Values of 1 are assigned 
to those households that reside in a region that adopted a UGB before the households’ move from 
their parents’ residence. UGBs are designed to contain the extent of fringe urbanization through a mix 
of policies designed to encourage urbanization within a defined boundary and discourage urbaniza-
tion outside the boundary. Such policies include urban service area boundaries, mixed-use urban 
zoning, restrictions on rural lot subdivisions, large-lot rural zoning, and rural land acquisition, 
among others. The data on UGB presence were obtained as part of ongoing research examining the 
effects of urban containment policies, initiated with a nationwide survey of metropolitan planning 
organizations. This survey instrument is described in Nelson, Dawkins, and Sanchez (2004).
Because the sprawl measures are likely highly correlated with one another, each measure is entered 
separately into each regression model. Each measure of urban sprawl is also allowed to vary with 
the central city—suburban location status of the renter—to determine if the effects of sprawl vary 
based on the intrametropolitan location of renters. All models also include several MSA location 
controls, including log of MSA population, MSA population growth rate, MSA average value of 
owner-occupied housing, and percentage of MSA occupied housing that is owned. A dummy vari-
able measuring the renter’s residential location relative to the central city is also included to control 
for the direct effect of central city location. Finally, regional controls are entered to account for 
region-specific heterogeneity. Each location-specific control is time varying in the following sense: 
Each time that an individual moves from his or her initial residence following splitoff, the location 
measures are updated to accurately describe the individual’s new residence. 
Results
Exhibit 3 reports the results from the baseline rental tenure duration model. Although all estimated 
models include controls for year of splitoff and Census Bureau region of residence, these coefficient 91 Cityscape
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estimates are suppressed for brevity. The baseline model and all subsequent models rely on the 
log-logistic parameterization. Initial examinations of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) sug-
gest that this model provides the best fit to the data, with an AIC of 2991 compared to 3053 for 
the exponential model, 3019 for the exponential model with gamma heterogeneity, and 3017 for 
the Weibull model. The likelihood ratio test statistic is also significant at a better than .01 level.
The results from the baseline model suggest that the amount of time until first-time homeowner-
ship becomes shorter with non-African-American household head status, age at time of splitoff, 
marital status, parents’ ownership status, and increases in transitory income. Consistent with 
Cooperstein (1989), transitory income, but not permanent income, influences the transition to 
first-time homeownership. Regarding the effect of location controls, residence in the central city 
and higher MSA housing values both increase the time until first-time homeownership transition. 
Exhibit 3
Variable Coef. Sig.
Baseline Log-Logistic Rental Tenure Duration Model
Personal and household characteristics
Constant 4.344 ***
Black 0.294 **
Age at splitoff – 0.051 ***
Male 0.003
Student at splitoff 0.291
Years of education  – 0.036
Marital status – 0.308 ***
Number of children – 0.020
Parents’ ownership status – 0.382 ***
Parents’ nonhousing wealtha 0.013
Permanent incomea – 0.009
Transitory incomea – 0.030 ***
Nonhousing wealtha – 0.039
Employment status – 0.186
Location controls
Central city 0.499 ***
Log MSA population 0.006
MSA population growth, 1980–90 0.051
Percent MSA owner occupant – 0.199
MSA average owner-occupied housing valuea 0.011 **
Urban density 0.037
Sigma 0.654 ***
Log-likelihood – 1,445.780
LR test of model significance 341.382 ***
N*T 10,350
MSA = metropolitan statistical area.
a In thousands of dollars.
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01. 
Note: All models also include controls for year of splitoff and U.S. census region.92 Regulatory Innovation and Affordable Housing
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Controlling for the full set of location controls, urban density is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. 
Exhibit 4 reports the estimated coefficients and the exponentiated coefficients from six different 
specifications of the baseline model, each employing different measures of urban sprawl. The 
estimates shown in the bottom three models (4 through 6) omit MSA housing values to determine 
whether controls for housing costs influence the magnitude of the effect of urban sprawl. The 
exponentiated coefficients, often described as “time ratios” in duration analysis, are similar to odds 
ratios in the traditional logit model and give an estimate of the percentage increase in rental tenure 
duration resulting from a 1-unit increase in a given covariate. Values above 1 imply percentage 
increases in rental tenure duration, while values below 1 imply percentage decreases in rental 
tenure duration. 
Exhibit 4 suggests that, with controls for MSA housing values, local government fragmentation and 
the presence of a UGB significantly influence the timing of first-time homeownership transitions. The 
coefficient for urban density becomes statistically significant only after controls for MSA housing values 
are omitted. This finding suggests that urban density likely influences the timing of homeowner-
ship transitions indirectly by reducing metropolitan housing affordability. The negative coefficient 
for UGB suggests that first-time homeownership occurs sooner in metropolitan areas surrounded 
by a UGB, a result that is somewhat unexpected. The next section explores this finding further. 
The coefficient estimates shown in the table in exhibit 5 reflect measures of sprawl that vary with 
the central city/suburban status of the household. This table shows that the effects of local govern-
ment fragmentation and UGB presence are significant only for suburban households. Furthermore, 
these effects are larger in magnitude than those reported in exhibit 4.
An examination of the coefficients from the same model specifications shown in exhibits 4 and 5 
shows estimates for a subsample of low-income households, defined as those households below 
the median income of the sample renters at the time of homeownership transition ($22,000). 
These estimates are displayed in exhibit 6. 
Exhibit 4
Model Variable Coef. Exp. (Coef.) Sig.
Impact of Sprawl on Rental Tenure Duration, Alternative Specifications
Baseline model, alternative measures of urban sprawl
(1) Urban density 0.037 1.037
(2) Local government fragmentation – 0.481 0.618 **
(3) UGB – 0.537 0.584 ***
Baseline model, alternative measures of urban sprawl, 
MSA average housing value omitted
(4) Urban density 0.066 1.068 **
(5) Local government fragmentation – 0.399 0.671 *
(6) UGB – 0.477 0.621 ***
MSA = metropolitan statistical area. UGB = urban growth boundary.
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.93 Cityscape
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Exhibit 5
Model Variable Coef. Exp. (Coef.) Sig.
Impact of Sprawl on Rental Tenure Duration, Stratified by Central City/Suburban 
Location
(1) Urban density (central city households) 0.065 1.067
Urban density (suburban households) 0.019 1.020
(2) Local government fragmentation (central city households) – 0.093 0.911
Local government fragmentation (suburban households) – 0.676 0.508 ***
(3) UGB (central city households) – 0.094 0.911
UGB (suburban households) – 0.684 0.504 ***
UGB = urban growth boundary.
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
Note: All models above also include full set of baseline controls.
Exhibit 6
Model Variable Coef. Exp. (Coef.) Sig.
Impact of Sprawl on Rental Tenure Duration (Low-Income Households Only)
Models ignoring central city-suburban interaction
(1) Urban density 0.060 1.061
(2) Local government fragmentation – 1.130 0.323 ***
(3) UGB – 0.589 0.555 *
Models incorporating urban sprawl-central city/suburban interaction
(4) Urban density (central city households) 0.146 1.158
Urban density (suburban households) 0.017 1.017
(5) Local government fragmentation (central city households) – 0.689 0.502
Local government fragmentation (suburban households) – 1.314 0.269 ***
(6) UGB (central city households) 0.178 1.194
UGB (suburban households) – 0.819 0.441 **
UGB = urban growth boundary.
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
Note: All models above also include full set of baseline controls.
A comparison of the table in exhibit 6 with the two previous tables shows that the effect of local 
government fragmentation and UGB presence is larger in magnitude for low-income renters. The 
differences in magnitude are particularly large for suburban low-income renters. Compared to the 
baseline model, the effect of local government fragmentation is nearly 3 times larger for suburban 
low-income households, while the effect of UGB presence is approximately 1.5 times larger. 
Discussion
These results shed light on the hypothesized effects of sprawl on affordability and first-time 
homeownership transitions. First, the estimated relationship between urban density and first-time 94 Regulatory Innovation and Affordable Housing
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homeownership transitions for the full sample of renters suggests that, despite their unique 
characteristics, first-time homebuyers do not seem to express stronger tastes for housing located 
in denser urban areas. Rather, the most significant dimension of urban form attracting renters to 
homeownership is the affordability that is found in less dense areas. After controlling for average 
MSA housing values, the effect of density disappears. 
The significant and negative relationship between local government fragmentation and the amount 
of time until first-time homeownership transition is consistent with the hypothesis that sprawled 
cities provide more options for housing consumers. Differences in the effect of Tiebout choice for 
central city and suburban renters suggest, however, that suburban choices are the choices that mat-
ter. This finding is expected, given the significant differences in fiscal capacity and local government 
service packages typically provided by central city governments relative to suburban governments. 
The relatively stronger relationship between local government fragmentation and first-time 
homeownership transitions among low-income renters is an interesting finding but one with 
ambiguous policy implications. On the one hand, this finding suggests that increased local public 
service choice is important to those low-income renters who have been successful in locating 
residential locations within the suburbs. On the other hand, if suburban governments also adopt 
fiscal zoning measures designed to exclude low-income residents from suburban jurisdictions, 
low-income renters may not be able to benefit from increased choice in many metropolitan areas. 
Furthermore, given the monocentric model’s assumption that the income elasticity of housing 
exceeds the income elasticity of leisure-time savings, most low-income residents will still tend to 
reside in or near the central city. To the extent that this tendency is the case, it is not clear that 
expanding suburban public service choices would necessarily lead to widespread increases in low-
income homeownership.
Perhaps the most surprising finding is that renters move into first-time homeownership more 
quickly within regions that are contained by a UGB. Furthermore, this effect is strongest among 
low-income suburban homebuyers. To determine if this result holds, controlling for measures of 
urban sprawl, additional models that included controls for urban density and presence or absence 
of a UGB were estimated. The results are largely comparable to those reported above, which sug-
gest that, even conditioning on measures of urban form, which UGBs should influence, UGBs exert 
an independent influence on the timing of first-time homeownership transitions.
This finding is consistent with other recent studies that found, in contrast to traditional land use 
regulatory regimes, jurisdictions adopting UGBs tend to be more proactive in accommodating 
affordable housing supply within areas designated for urbanization. Nelson, Dawkins, and Sanchez 
(2005) found that jurisdictions surrounded by a UGB saw increased retention of the existing 
affordable housing stock over time. Pendall (2000) found that UGBs did not have the same exclu-
sionary effects as did other more traditional forms of land use regulation. 
There are several possible explanations for why regulatory regimes pursuing a strategy of urban 
containment, compared with other types of local regulatory regimes, may actually serve to improve 
access to affordable owner-occupied housing. One possible explanation is that most of the UGBs in 
the sample (see exhibit 7) are located within states that require local governments to adopt afford-95 Cityscape
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able housing strategies as part of the local planning process. Most jurisdictions with UGBs in this 
sample are located in California. Since 1969, California has required local governments to include 
within their local comprehensive plans an affordable housing element that identifies strategies for 
accommodating the jurisdiction’s share of projected regional housing demand. Other states repre-
sented in the sample (Oregon, New Jersey, Florida) have also adopted similar provisions requiring 
local governments to include affordable housing elements within their local comprehensive plans. 
One possible test of this hypothesis is an examination of the effect of UGB presence in models that 
also include a measure of the state’s stance toward such affordable housing mandates. In regres-
sions that include a dummy variable indicating that the surrounding state requires an affordable 
housing element to be included in the local comprehensive plan,1 UGB presence is still statistically 
significant, while the state housing mandate dummy variable is not significant. 
Another possible explanation is that regulatory regimes based on a philosophy of urban contain-
ment may include more local regulatory tools that facilitate affordable housing provision than 
do other more traditional regulatory regimes. Such tools include mixed-use zoning ordinances, 
flexible zoning for affordable housing, and more aggressive monitoring of regional land supply. 
Nelson and Dawkins (2004) examined more than 100 urban containment plans nationwide and 
found that those jurisdictions with the strongest antisprawl measures tended also to adopt more 
flexible zoning programs and more aggressive affordable housing strategies. The inclusion of such 
affordable housing policies within an aggressive urban containment program may help to ensure 
political acceptability of antisprawl measures by the local citizenry and building community. 
A final explanation is that the regional land use planning organizations responsible for adopting 
and implementing a UGB program may also have regulatory authority to override suburban efforts 
to enact exclusionary zoning ordinances. New Jersey, for example, empowers county governments 
to adopt regional fair-share affordable housing strategies, which limit the ability of local govern-
ments to pursue exclusionary zoning strategies. This argument is supported by our finding that the 
effects of UGB presence are largest and most significant among suburban low-income residents. 
1 According to a recent report published by the American Planning Association (2002), these states include California, 
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, New Jersey, Oregon, and Washington.
Exhibit 7
UGBs in the Sample
Tucson, AZ  Bradenton, FL 
San Diego, CA  Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 
San Francisco-Oakland, CA  Wilmington, NC 
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA  Lincoln, NE
Sacramento, CA  Atlantic City, NJ 
Fresno, CA  Eugene-Springfield, OR 
Greeley, CO  Medford, OR 
Miami, FL  Salem, OR 
Orlando, FL  Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA 
UGB = urban growth boundary.96 Regulatory Innovation and Affordable Housing
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To determine which of these two latter hypotheses is more plausible, additional regressions, which 
allowed the UGB variable to vary by MSA, were run. All UGB MSAs with fewer than 20 observations 
were grouped into a single category to ensure sufficient degrees of freedom to estimate the UGB 
effect. Because of high multicollinearity between the MSA-stratified measures of UGB presence and 
many MSA-level covariates, only a limited number of location controls in these models (regional 
controls, central city of residence, and log of MSA population) were included. These results are 
reported in exhibit 8.
From Model 1 in exhibit 8, we find that three metropolitan areas account for most of the UGB 
effect: Riverside, California; Miami, Florida; and Twin Cities, Minnesota. One unique characteristic 
of each of these metropolitan areas is their relatively strong form of regional governance. Riverside 
is a metropolitan area surrounded by a single county government, Miami is a city-county consolidated 
government, and Twin Cities is governed by one of the nation’s only regional governments with 
leaders appointed by the state of Minnesota. In each of these metropolitan areas, strong regional 
governments possibly curb the exclusionary practices of suburban municipalities within the region.
Twin Cities is an interesting case in point. During the 1970s, this region adopted one of the nation’s 
first regional fair-share housing strategies, which required all local governments within the region 
to accommodate their fair share of the region’s affordable housing needs. According to Goetz, 
Chapple, and Lukermann (2005), the efficacy of this program has varied over time. During the 
1980s, changes in regional and state political leadership, combined with shifting national political 
tides, led to a significant weakening of the region’s fair-share requirements. Model 2 in exhibit 8 
Exhibit 8
Variable
Model 1 Model 2
Coef.
Exp. 
(Coef.)
Sig. Coef.
Exp. 
(Coef.)
Sig.
UGB Effect, Stratified by MSA
San Diego, CA  0.295 1.344 0.285 1.330
San Francisco-Oakland, CA  1.183 3.264 1.175 3.237
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA  – 1.305 0.271 *** – 1.283 0.277 ***
Sacramento, CA  1.107 3.025 1.093 2.984
Fresno, CA  – 0.522 0.594 – 0.514 0.598
Miami, FL  – 0.863 0.422 ** – 0.840 0.432 **
Orlando, FL  – 0.288 0.750 – 0.274 0.760
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI  – 0.567 0.567 * — —
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI (1978–81) — — – 1.467 0.231 ***
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI (1982–97) — — – 0.137 0.872
Atlantic City, NJ  7.524 1,852.660 7.912 2,730.452
Eugene-Springfield, OR  – 0.215 0.806 – 0.200 0.819
Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA  – 0.578 0.561 – 0.558 0.572
Remaining UGBs – 0.245 0.783 – 0.231 0.794
MSA = metropolitan statistical area. UGB = urban growth boundary.
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
Note: Model includes full set of baseline controls, excluding MSA housing value, MSA population change, and MSA owner-
occupied percentage.97 Cityscape
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allows the effect of the Twin Cities variable to vary by the date at which this political shift began 
(1982). As shown in Model 2, Twin Cities influenced homeownership transitions only during the 
period when the regional fair-share program was at its strongest. After 1982, the Twin Cities effect 
was not statistically significant.
Conclusion
This article examined the relationship between various dimensions of urban sprawl and the timing 
of first-time homeownership transitions. The article found that, for the average renter in the sample, 
first-time homeownership occurs sooner in areas with lower urban densities, increased local government 
fragmentation, and the presence of a regional urban growth boundary. Urban density influences 
homeownership transitions indirectly through effects on housing affordability. The effects of UGB 
presence and local government fragmentation are largest among suburban low-income households. 
These results suggest that increased urban sprawl accelerates the transition to first-time homeowner-
ship, primarily by influencing housing affordability and local public service choice. 
No evidence supports the claim that UGBs restrict housing choices for first-time homebuyers. In fact, 
the results suggest the opposite: first-time homeownership is enhanced in regions with regional 
UGB programs in place. The overall pattern of results suggests that the most likely explanation 
for the offsetting effects of UGBs is that such metropolitan areas are likely governed by stronger 
regional institutions with authority to override, or at least discourage, local exclusionary zoning 
practices. The results point to an important challenge facing regional policymakers seeking to promote 
first-time homeownership: enhancing local public service choice through increased decentralization 
of local public services while maintaining centralized regional control over land use regulation.98 Regulatory Innovation and Affordable Housing
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Variable Coef. Sig.
Appendix A
Permanent Income Regression Results
Constant – 19.412 ***
Black – 5.650 ***
Age  2.173 ***
Age squared – 0.039 ***
Male 3.075 ***
Nonhousing wealtha  0.034 ***
Years of education  0.729 ***
Employment status – 0.294
Professional occupation 13.964 ***
Manager/administrator occupation 11.908 ***
Sales occupation 3.054 ***
Clerical occupation 4.593 ***
Craftsman occupation 9.878 ***
Operative occupation 5.759 ***
Transport occupation 7.524 ***
Laborer occupation 3.691 ***
Farmer occupation 10.100 **
Midwest Region  – 3.146 ***
South Region – 2.566 ***
West Region – 0.345
Adj-R2 0.220
N*T 10,350
a In thousands of dollars.
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
Notes: Omitted occupation category: service occupation. Omitted regional control: Northeast.99 Cityscape
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